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CASENOTES

DOUGLASS V. HUSTLER MAGAZINE, INC.:*
ANATOMY OF PRIVACY FOR A PUBLIC
"FIGURE" IN ILLINOIS
Ever since the inception of the common law tort of privacy,'
much confusion has existed regarding the scope of the tort's
protection. Part of the confusion exists because the tort has evolved
from a single concept into four distinct torts.2 The degree of
* 769 F.2d 1128 (7th Cir. 1985), petition for cert. filed, 54 U.S.L.W. 3505 (U.S.
Jan. 28, 1986).
1. Legal redress for a violation of one's right of privacy was first addressed in an
1890 law review article. Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv.
193 (1890). The now famous article was written in response to unfavorable newspaper
reports of Mrs. Samuel Warren's Beacon Hill social events. The final provocation
occurred when the local newspapers "had a field day" reporting Warren's daughter's
wedding. Mr. Warren then contacted his former law partner, Louis D. Brandeis, and
the two began a new chapter in the law. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 38384 (1960).
2. Dean Prosser recognized that the right of privacy evolved from a single
concept into four distinct torts: 1) unreasonable intrusion into seclusion; 2) public
disclosure of a private fact; 3) false light in the public eye; and 4) appropriation of
name or likeness. Prosser, supra note 1, at 389-407. He acknowledged that the four
concepts had very little in common. Id. at 389. The one common thread running
throughout, however, is that all four protect the plaintiffs right to be left alone. Id.
See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS 117 (5th ed. 1984); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977). See also Trubow, Information Law Overview, 18 J.
MAR. L. REV. 815, 818 (1985) (commenting on common law privacy torts impact on
communications technology).
Unreasonable intrusion into seclusion involves the objectionable intrusion into a
person's solitude. Prosser, supra note 1, at 389-92. The intrusion must be
objectionable to the reasonable person. Id. Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986 (2d. Cir.
1973) (photographer's constant harassment of a public figure held to be an intrusion).
See, e.g., Pearson v. Dodd, 410 F.2d 701 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 947 (1969)
(tort is complete when information is obtained by improperly intrusive means);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977); Note, Criminationof Peeping Toms
and Other Men of Vision, 5 ARK. L. REy. 388 (1951) (noted before Prosser's article
appeared that "peeping Toms" intrude on one's privacy).
According to Prosser, a public disclosure of a private fact involves three
elements: 1) the disclosure must be public, not private; 2) the facts disclosed must be
private; and 3) the matter made public must be highly objectionable to the
reasonable person. Prosser, supra note 1 at 392-98. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON,
THE LAW OF TORTS 117 (5th ed. 1984). The Restatement of Torts added a fourth
requirement, namely, that the general public must not have a legitimate interest in
the information.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 652D (1977).

The Restatement's definition of false light privacy is:
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acceptance of the four privacy torts has not been uniform among the
states.$ Illinois, for example, has historically recognized only the tort
of appropriation.4 In Douglass v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.,' the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit for the first
time explicitly recognized the existence of the false light tort in
Illinois.6 Unfortunately, the Douglass court added to existing
confusion about the appropriation tort by failing to distinguish it
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning another that places the other
before the public in a false light is subject to liability to the other for invasion
of his privacy, if (a) the false light in which the other was placed would be
highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) the actor had knowledge of or
acted in reckless disregard as to the falsity of the publicized matter and the
false light in which the other would be placed.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (1977). See infra notes 53-65 and
accompanying text. See also Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 245
(1974) (false story causing the public to pity the plaintiffs held an invasion of
privacy); Time v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967) (Supreme Court recognition of the false
light tort); W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 117 (5th ed. 1984)
(comprehensive examination of false light privacy); Prosser, supra note 1, at 398-401
(written during the early development of the tort and notes similarities to the tort of
defamation (see infra note 39)). But see Kalven, Privacy in Tort Law - Were
Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROas. 326, 339-41 (1966)
(criticism of false light privacy coexisting with the law of defamation).
The fourth privacy tort involves the appropriation of a plaintiff's name or
likeness for the defendant's benefit or use. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C
(1977). The interest protected is the individual's exclusive use of his own identity. Id.
The unlawful appropriation of one's identity was the first privacy tort that the courts
recognized. See, e.g., Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 212 N.C. 780, 195 S.E. 55 (1938).
See infra notes 72-80 and accompanying text. See also W. PROSSER & W. KEETON,
THE LAW OF TORTS § 117 (5th ed. 1984). See generally Kalven, Privacy in Tort Law
- Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 326, 331 (1966)
(an article generally critical of privacy law, but nevertheless supportive of the
appropriation tort).
3. The following are jurisdications which have expressly adopted Prosser's four
categories: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware,
District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Texas, Vermont, and the Virgin Islands. See
generally 3 LDRC 50 - STATE SURVEY (H. Kaufman ed. 1984) (survey of defamation
and related torts encompassing all fifty states and U.S. territories).
4. Comment, Privacy in Illinois: Torts Without Remedies, 17 J. MAR. L. REV.
799, 818 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Privacy In Illinois]. The privacy tort of
appropriation was first recognized in Illinois in 1952. Eick v. Perk Dog Food Co., 347
Ill. App. 293, 106 N.E.2d 742 (1952). In Eick, Justice Schwartz was inspired by the
Warren and Brandeis article and, therefore, recognized the right of privacy in Illinois.
Id. at 295, 106 N.E.2d at 743. The defendant used a photograph of a blind girl to
promote the sale of dog food. Id. at 294, 106 N.E.2d at 743. The court held that the
defendant unlawfully appropriated the plaintiff's likeness and, therefore, violated her
right of privacy. Id. at 306, 106 N.E.2d at 748. See also Carlson v. Dell Publishing
Co., 65 Ill. App. 2d 209, 213 N.E.2d 39 (1965) (acknowledged appropriation tort but
denied plaintiff's recovery); Bradley v. Cowles Magazines, Inc., 26 Ill. App. 2d 331,
168 N.E.2d 64 (1960) (limited the recovery in Eick by denying recovery for a mother
who read a publication about her son); Annerino v. Dell Publishing Co., 17 Ill. App.
2d 205, 149 N.E.2d 761 (1958) (use of plaintiff's photograph in a story about her
husband's murder held to be an invasion of privacy).
5. 769 F.2d 1128 (7th Cir. 1985).
6. Id. at 1133. See infra notes 51-67 and accompanying text.
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from the right of publicity.7
In 1974, aspiring actress Robyn Douglass posed nude for
freelance photographer Augustin Gregory.' The photographs were to
appear in upcoming issues of Playboy Magazine. 9 In 1980, Gregory
was hired as photography editor of Hustler Magazine." Gregory's
portfolio included the nude photographs of Douglass." Lacking
Douglass' consent, 2 Hustler published the nude photographs in the
January, 1981 issue of the magazine.' 3
7. Id. at 1138-39. See infra notes 68-98 and accompanying text.
8. Douglass, 769 F.2d at 1131. Gregory was a codefendant in the case. In 1974,
Douglass posed for Gregory on two occasions. During the first session, Douglass posed
nude with another woman. Those pictures were intended for Playboy's "Ripped-Off"
pictorial. Douglass posed alone during the second session. Those pictures were
intended for Playboy's "Water and Sex" pictorial. Id. at 1131-32.
9. Douglass, 769 F.2d at 1131-32. The "Ripped-Off" pictorial appeared in the
March, 1975 issue of Playboy. Playboy never published the "Water and Sex"
pictorial. Douglass appeared in Playboy eight times between 1974 and 1976. Brief for
Appellant at 2, Douglass v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 769 F.2d 1128 (7th Cir. 1985).
After all of the photo sessions, Douglass signed a release which gave Playboy sole
rights to publish or distribute the photographs. Douglass, 769 F.2d at 1131. At the
trial, Douglass contended that she went to the Playboy offices the day after each
photo session, and signed a standard Playboy Enterprises model release. Gregory,
however, testified that Douglass signed one of his own standard releases before
leaving the studio. Brief for Appellant at 5, Douglass v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 769
F.2d 1128 (7th Cir. 1985).
10. Douglass, 769 F.2d at 1131-32. Gregory's hiring was based, in part, on
Hustler's desire to publish nude photographs of celebrities. Id. at 1132. Douglass had
obtained celebrity status by various movie and television appearances. Id. In 1977,
Douglass was cast as the female lead in the successful movie, "Breaking Away." In
1979, she appeared as a regular on the television series "Battlestar Gallactica." As a
result of her film and television success, Douglass became a popular spokesperson for
many national products. Her commercial contacts were through several Chicagobased advertising agencies. Id.
After Hustler hired Gregory, its management asked him for releases authorizing
the publication of the photographs. Id. at 1132. At trial, Gregory said that he could
not locate any releases at first, but eventually submitted two. Id. Hustler presented
only copies of the releases at trial. Id. The parties stipulated that one of the releases
was a forgery, while the quality of the other was too poor to authenticate. Id.
11. Id. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
12. Prior to publication, Douglass discovered she was to be featured in the
magazine. Id. The announcement of the "Robyn Douglass Nude" pictorial appeared
in the December, 1980, issue of Hustler. Id. When Douglass learned she was to be
featured, she contacted Hustler and informed them they had no authority to publish
the photographs. Id. Hustler made no effort to recall the issue and it went on sale.
Id.
13. See supra note 8. The pictorial was three pages long. The first page
contained a photograph from the "Water and Sex" shoot, as well as a still photograph
from "Battlestar Gallactica." The text made reference to Douglass' career and stated
"Robyn has been trained to use her body as a tool of her trade." The second page
included more photographs from the "Water and Sex" shoot, in addition to
photographs from the "Ripped-Off" pictorial. The third page included a still from
"Breaking Away," as well as two photographs from the "Ripped-Off" pictorial.
The text of the pictorial refered to the other woman in the "Ripped-Off"
photographs as "a female friend." The text read in part, "[f]rom the looks of Robyn
....
she's never had difficulty finding climactic moments." Id. at 1132-35.
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Douglass brought suit in the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois 14 alleging that Gregory and Hustler
violated her right to privacy under Illinois law.15 Specifically, she
claimed the publication placed her in a false light and unlawfully
appropriated her name and likeness." The trial court entered
judgment in Douglass' favor and awarded her $600,000.17 The
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed."
The appellate court addressed whether Douglass stated a valid
case of action for false light privacy.19 In addition, the court
addressed whether Hustler had appropriated Douglass' name and
likeness in violation of her right of publicity.2 The court held that
the false light branch of privacy and the right of publicity are
recognized civil wrongs in Illinois,2 and that Douglass stated a valid
claim for each, but reversed the judgment on other grounds.2
In its analysis, the court first examined Illinois' treatment of the
false light invasion of privacy.23 Judge Posner, writing for a
unanimous court, noted that no Illinois court had ever expressly
found liability based on the tort.2' He observed, however, that some
Illinois courts had implied that the tort existed.2 Judge Posner
reasoned that the absence of any case in which liability for the tort
14. Douglass v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 607 F. Supp. 816 (N.D. Ill. 1984).
15. Id.
16. Id. Douglass' false light claim was based on two theories. First, she alleged
that Hustler falsely portrayed her as a lesbian. Douglass, 769 F.2d at 1135. Douglass
claimed that the "Ripped-Off" photographs, together with the text insinuated that
she was a lesbian. Id. At trial, the author of the text testified that it was his intention
to create the homosexual inferences. Brief for the Appellant at 15, Douglass v.
Hustler Magazine, Inc., 769 F.2d 1128 (7th Cir. 1985).
Second, Douglass contended that Hustler falsely implied her voluntary
association with the magazine. Douglass, 769 F.2d at 1135. Douglass argued that the
manner of the pictorial suggests that she willingly posed for Hustler. Id. She cited as
evidence a previous issue of Hustler in which Larry Flynt, the magazine's publisher,
had announced that he does not publish photographs of women without their
consent. Id. But see infra note 67 and accompanying text (Hustler'sdefense of this
contention).
17. Douglass v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 607 F. Supp. 816 (N.D. Ill. 1984).
Douglass was awarded $500,000 in compensatofy damages. She was also awarded
$1,500,000 in punitive damages which was remitted to $100,000. Id. For a discussion
of the appellate court's treatment of damages, see infra note 76 and accompanying
text.
18. Douglass v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 769 F.2d 1128 (7th Cir. 1985).
19. Id. at 1134-38. See infra notes 51-67 and accompanying text.
20. Id. at 1138-40. See infra notes 68-98 and accompanying text.
21. Douglass, 769 F.2d at 1133, 1139. Because there is no general federal
common law, federal courts must apply the law as it believes the state courts would.
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). See also Privacy in Illinois, supra note 4,
at 824-27 (federal court's interpretation of Illinois privacy law).
22. Id. at 1140. See infra note 44.
23. Douglass, 769 F.2d at 1133.
24. Id. at 1133. For a discussion of the existence of the false light branch of
privacy see infra notes 51-63 and accompanying text.
25. Douglass, 769 F.2d at 1133.
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was imposed was due only to the fact that no Illinois court had yet
been presented with a valid false light claim.2 Therefore, Judge
Posner turned to whether Douglass stated a valid false light claim.
The court applied a two-step analysis to determine whether
Douglass had a valid cause of action for false light privacy.2 7 First,
the court analyzed the negative implications of the pictorial.2 8 After
viewing the pictorial and accompanying text, 9 the court concluded
that a reasonable jury could infer negative implications from the
pictorial. The jury could believe that Douglass was a lesbian,30 and a
reasonable jury could also find that Douglass' association with
Hustler in itself would be degrading.2 Second, the court analyzed
the falsity of the negative implications.3 2 The evidence showed that
26. Id. at 1133. See infra notes 51-63 and accompanying text. The court
recognized that the false light branch of privacy has been under criticism, chiefly
because it overlaps with defamation. Douglass, 769 F.2d at 1133.
Prosser defines a defamatory statement as one "which tends to hold the plaintiff
up to hatred, contempt, or ridicule, or to cause him to be shunned or avoided." W.
PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW oF TORTS 111 (5th ed. 1984). See, e.g., Kimmerle v.
New York Evening Journal, 262 N.Y. 99, 186 N.E. 217 (1933) (publication alleging
that plaintiff had been "courting" a married man held nondefamatory). But see
Youssoupoff v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Pictures, Ltd., 50 T.L.R. 581 (C.A. 1934) (false
statement that a woman was raped was held to be defamatory).
A statement holding someone in a false light need not be defamatory, although it
very often is. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS 117 (5th ed. 1984). An
action for defamation is designed to protect a person's interest in a good reputation.
Id. An action for false light invasion of privacy, however, is designed to protect a
person's interest in being let alone. Id. This action is available when there has been
publicity that is highly offensive. Id.
The Restatement acknowledges a major concern regarding the similarity of the
two torts:
When the false publicity is also defamatory so that either action can be
maintained by the plaintiff, it is arguable that limitations of long standing that
have been found desirable for the action of defamation should not be
successfully evaded by proceeding upon a different theory of later origin, in the
development of which the attention of the courts has not been directed to the
limitations.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OP TORTS § 652E comment e (1977). See also Renwick v.
News and Observer, 310 N.C. 312, 320, 312 S.E.2d 405, 413 (1984) (court did not
recognize false light in North Carolina because of the overlap with defamation);
Kalven, supra note 2, at 339-41 (critical of false light because of the overlap); Prosser,
supra note 1, at 400-01 (fears false light may eventually swallow up defamation).
The Douglass court acknowledged that in some instances proving a false light
claim may be more difficult than proving a defamation claim. Douglass, 769 F.2d at
1133. For example, a plaintiff in a false light claim must prove that the materials
have been widely publicized. Id. In defamation, however, the degree of publicity will
not preclude a cause of action. Id.
27. Douglass, 769 F.2d at 1134.
28. Id.
29.

See supra note 13.

30. Douglass, 769 F.2d at 1135.
31. To decide this issue, the court engaged in a section-by-section analysis of
Hustler. The discussion ended with page 51 of a 136 page issue. The court concluded
that voluntary association with Hustler "is unquestionably degrading to a normal
person ... " Id. at 1136.
32. Id. at 1135.
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Douglass was not a lesbian,33 and that she did not voluntarily
3 4
associate herself with Hustler.
The court held, therefore, that
Douglass' claim that Hustler had placed her in a false light was
valid.35
The court next addressed whether Hustler had v;olated
Douglass' rights under the appropriation branch of privacy.30 In his
analysis, Judge Posner used the terms "appropriation branch of
privacy" and "right of publicity" synonymously. 7 He reasoned that
the unauthorized publication exploited Douglass' talents by using
her notoriety to sell magazines, and that she should be compensated
for such exploitation."
The court then considered Hustler's affirmative defenses."
Hustler asserted that, under the Constitutional protections of the
First Amendment, the plaintiff must establish actual malice 0 by
clear and convincing evidence." Following the United States
33. All parties agreed that Douglass is not a lesbian. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. See infra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
36. Douglass, 769 F.2d at 1138.
37. Id. The court stated that, "Hustler also violated [Douglass'] right under the
commercial appropriation branch of privacy - what is sometimes called the 'right of
publicity'." Id.
38. Id. at 1139.
39. Id. at 1139. For a discussion of the court's other reasons for reversal see
infra note 46.
40. In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), the United States
Supreme Court defined actual malice as a statement made with either actual
knowledge of its falsity or a reckless disregard for the truth. Id. at 280. The Court
developed the actual malice requirement to protect the first amendment rights of
media defendants against libel actions brought by public officials. Id.
In Sullivan, a police commissioner from Montgomery, Alabama claimed that he
had been defamed in an advertisement that appeared in The New York Times. Id. at
254. The Court denied recovery and held that a state cannot award damages to a
public official for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he
proves actual malice. Id.
In St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968), the Court elaborated on its
definition of actual malice. A plaintiff can prove actual malice by demonstrating that
the defendant entertained serious doubts as to the truth or his publication. Id. at 731.
See also Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 245 (1974) (reinforced
proposition that actual malice does not mean ill will); Rosenblatt v. Baer, 380 U.S.
356 (1965) (held that public official standard applied to public employees who
exercise substantial government power). S. METCALF, RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES OF
PUBLISHERS, BROADCASTERS AND REPORTERS 1.18 (Sup. 1985) (concise history of the
development of the actual malice concept); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 580A
(1977) (adopts the Sullivan definition).
41. Douglass, 769 F.2d at 1139. The Sullivan Court said that the U.S.
Constitution demands that actual malice be proven with "convincing clarity." 376
U.S. at 285-86. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 324 (1974)
(approved of clear and convincing standard, but held it inapplicable because plaintiff
was a private figure). But see Bloomfield v. Retail Credit Co., 14 Il1. App.3d 158, 302
N.E.2d 88 (1973) (approves of a jury instruction which requires proof of actual malice
by a preponderance of the evidence).
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Supreme Court's holding in Time v. Hill,42 the court agreed actual
malice operates as a first amendment defense to privacy claims.' 8
Based on the trial evidence, the court concluded that the jury could
have found that Hustler acted with actual malice.4 ' The court held,
however, that the trial court committed a reversible error4" when it
instructed the jury to apply merely a preponderance standard
instead of a clear and convincing standard.46
.42. 385 U.S. 374 (1967). In Hill, the Court held that an action for invasion of
privacy is subject to the same first amendment restrictions as defamation. Id. at 388.
See supra note 40.
In 1952, three escaped convicts held James Hill and his family hostage in their
home for nineteen hours. Id. at 388. The Hills were released unharmed. In order to
avoid publicity of the matter, the Hills moved to another state. Id. In 1953, a novel
entitled The Desperate Hours was published. Id. The story depicted a family being
held hostage by escaped convicts. Id. In the novel, however, the family was brutally
beaten and subjected to verbal sexual insults. Id. The novel was later made into a
play. Id.
In 1955, Life Magazine did an article about the play which suggested The
Desperate Hours faithfully depicted the Hill's experience. Id. at 377. The Hills
contended that the article violated their right to privacy. Id. at 378. The trial court
found for the Hills, based on New York's privacy statute (see infra note 84). Id. at
379. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, ordering the lower court to apply
the Sullivan standard to find liability. Id. at 396. See also Campbell v. Seabury Press,
614 F.2d 395, 397 (5th Cir. 1980) (held that the first amendment mandates a
constitutional privilege applicable to privacy torts where publicity is an element). Cf.
Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 245, 256 (1974) (Court held that the
Sullivan test applies to false light privacy cases, but did not disapprove of a
preponderance jury instruction); Braun v. Flynt, 726 F.2d 245, 248-49 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 105 S.Ct. 252 (1984) (in a privacy case, court correctly held that Sullivan test
did not apply to private individual, but also did not disapprove of a preponderance
jury instruction). See generally Hill, Defamation and Privacy Under the First
Amendment, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 1205 (1976) (compares similarities between
defamation and privacy and discusses relationship of each with the first amendment).
43. Douglass, 769 F.2d at 1140 (citing Bichler v. Union Bank and Trust Co., 715
F.2d 1059, 1063 (6th Cir. 1983)).
44. Douglass, 769 F.2d at 1139. Hustler contended that the jury should not
have found actual malice because the magazine actually believed they had valid
releases from Douglass. Id. Hustler contended that Augustin Gregory defrauded
them. Id. The court answered Hustler's contention in two ways. First, Hustler had
been unable to produce the releases of Douglass' co-model in the "Ripped-Off"
pictorial. Id. This tended to show that Hustler knew the Douglass releases were not
authentic. Id. Second, if Gregory knew the releases were fraudulent, his knowledge
would be imputed to Hustler through the doctrine of respondeat superior. Id. at
1139-40. Gregory was acting in the scope of his employment as photography editor, so
that his knowledge of the falsity of the releases was imputed to the corporation. Id.
The doctrine of respondeat superior is fully applicable to suits for defamation and
privacy, notwithstanding the limitations of the first amendment. Id. See, e.g.,
Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 245, 253 (1974) (newspaper reporter's
knowledge of false statements imputed to publisher); Hunt v. Liberty Lobby, 720
F.2d 631, 648-49 (11th Cir. 1983) (independent contractor's knowledge of falsity
regarding the John F. Kennedy assassination is imputed to the publisher).
45. For a discussion of reversible error predicted on an incorrect burden of
proof instruction, see Meiners v. Moriority, 563 F.2d 343, 350-51 (7th Cir. 1977).
46. Douglass, 769 F.2d at 1140. In addition, the court held that the introduction
of 128 slides depicting Hustler's "vulgarity" was unfairly prejudicial. Id. at 1141-42.
The court also decided that an undisclosed agreement not to execute judgment
between Douglass and Gregory warranted reversal. Id. at 1142-43. The court agreed
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The Douglass court's analysis of Ms. Douglass' claim helped to
clarify one area of privacy law in Illinois, yet added confusion to
another. The court was correct in holding that Illinois recognizes the
false light theory of privacy and properly determined that Douglass
had stated a valid claim.' 7 The court was incorrect, however, in
holding that Hustler violated Douglass' right of publicity. By
erroneously equating a privacy right of appropriation with the right
of publicity,"8 the court added to the confusion already existing in
this area, because while the appropriation tort is recognized in
Illinois, the publicity tort is not.' Additionally, the court's approval
of a first amendment defense to a right of publicity cause of action
is improper and inconsistent with a prior holding of the United
States Supreme Court.50

The Douglass court correctly reasoned that, although no
plaintiff had yet been successful in litigating a false light claim, the

tort nevertheless existed in Illinois.5 1 The history of privacy cases in
Illinois supports this conclusion."9 For example, in Leopold v.
Levin,5 8 the Illinois Supreme Court considered whether a
fictionalized novel of the famous Leopold-Loeb case violated Nathan
Leopold's right to privacy.6 ' Leopold claimed that the author
"knowingly fictionalized accounts" of his life.55 The court denied
recovery because the accounts were of a public nature, and thus
were not subject to any privacy protection." The court nevertheless
with Hustler's claim that the agreement should have been disclosed so Hustler would
be more aggressive in their cross-examination of Gregory. Id.
47. Id. at 1132-38. See infra notes 51-67 and accompanying text.
48. Id. at 138. See supra note 37.
49. See infra notes 88-89 and accompanying text. See also Privacy in Illinois,
supra note 4, at 814-15, n. 102 (discussion of the right of publicity in Illinois).
50. See infra notes 99-107 and accompanying text.
51. Douglass, 769 F.2d at 1132-33.
52. See generally, Privacy in Illinois, supra note 4, (comprehensive analysis of
the history of the privacy torts in Illinois).
53. 45 Ill. 2d 434, 259 N.E.2d 250 (1970).
54. Id. In 1924, Richard Loeb and Nathan Leopold, Jr. pleaded guilty to the
kidnapping and murder of a 14 year-old boy, Bobby Franks. Id. at 436, 259 N.E.2d at
252. Each defendant was sentenced to consecutive prison sentences of life and 99
years. Id. The trial attracted international notoriety. Id.
The novel Compulsion was published in 1956. Id. The author, Meyer Levin, was
a fellow student of the defendants. Id. Although the novel was fiction, all parties
agreed that it was factually based on the crime. Id. at 437, 259 N.E.2d at 252.
The Leopold case was the first opportunity the Illinois Supreme Court had to
recognize the right to privacy. Id. at 439, 259 N.E.2d at 253. The court noted that the
right of privacy had been recognized at the appellate level in Eick v. Perk Dog Food
Co., 347 Ill. App. 293, 106 N.E.2d 742 (1952) (see Eick discussion supra note 4). The
Leopold court also noted that the Illinois legislature had implicitly recognized the
cause of action through enactment of a statute of limitations for privacy suits.
Leopold, 45 Ill. 2d at 439, 259 N.E.2d at 253 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 83, § 14 (1967)
(current version at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 13-201 (1983)).
55. Leopold, 45 Ill. 2d at 439, 259 N.E.2d at 253.
56. Id. at 441, 259 N.E.2d at 254. The court observed that the right to privacy is
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implied in dicta that the false light tort existed in Illinois.5
A claim similar to Leopold's was raised in Andreani v.
Hansen,58 where a letter to the editor of a local newspaper falsely
implied that the plaintiffs were ruthless businessmen." The
Andreani court held that the subject matter of a letter involved a
legitimate public interest, and therefore, the plaintiff's case was
barred. 0 Had the subject matter been different, however, the
plaintiff might have prevailed. In Midwest Glass Co. v. Stanford
Development Co., ' the court of appeals, in dictum, implied that all
four branches of common law privacy are recognized in Illinois." All
three cases suggest the willingness of Illinois courts to recognize
false light privacy. The Douglass court was correct, therefore, when
limited in areas of legitimate public interest. Id. at 440, 259 N.E.2d at 254 (citing
Eick v. Perk Dog Food Co., 347 Ill. App. 293, 106 N.E.2d 742 (1952)). The Leopold
court concluded that the Leopold-Loeb case was still of legitimate public interest.
Leopold, 45 Ill. 2d at 441, 259 N.E.2d at 254.
57. See Douglass, 769 F.2d at 1133 (noting that the Leopold court raised several
points that would be unnecessary unless false light existed in Illinois).
58. 80 Ill. App. 3d 726, 400 N.E.2d 679 (1980).
59. Id. at 728, 400 N.E.2d at 681. In Andreani, the plaintiffs were builders and
real estate developers who owned a tract of land that the local park district wished to
buy. Id. at 727, 400 N.E.2d at 680. The two sides could not come to terms so the park
district instituted condemnation proceedings. Id.
The plaintiffs alleged that the letter to the editor held them in a false light. Id.
The Andreani court, while acknowledging the plaintiffs' claim, denied recovery. Id. at
730, 400 N.E.2d at 681.
60. Id. A plaintiff's right to privacy is weighed against the public's interest in
the publication. See Time Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1966) (opening of a new play
linked to an actual incident is a matter of public interest); Rozhon v. Triangle
Productions, Inc., 230 F.2d 359 (7th Cir. 1956) (death from the use of narcotics
considered legitimate public interest); Buzinski v. Do-All Co., 31111. App. 2d 191, 175
N.E.2d 577 (1961) (plaintiff's picture used in connection with a new mobile home is of
public interest); Eick v. Perk Dog Food Co., 347 Ill. App. 2d 191, 175 N.E.2d 577
(1952) (no legitimate news interest in girl's picture on a box of dog food).
61. 34 Ill. App. 3d 130, 339 N.E.2d 274 (1975).
62. Id. at 133, 339 N.E.2d at 277. In Midwest Glass, the plaintiff sued the
defendant for payment of a debt. Id. at 131, 339 N.E.2d at 275. The defendant filed
counterclaim, alleging an invasion of privacy by public disclosure of private facts. Id.
The court dismissed the counterclaim, holding that the defendant did not state a
valid cause of action. Id. at 134, 339 N.E.2d at 277.
In addition, in Cantrell v. American Broadcasting Co., Inc., 529 F. Supp. 746, the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois acknowledged the
existence of the false light tort. In Cantrell, Judge Kocoras held that statements
made during a television broadcast entitled "Arson for Profit" constituted a false
light invasion of the plaintiff's privacy. Id. at 756-59. The court, citing Midwest
Glass, stated that Illinois had recognized Prosser's four privacy torts. Id. at 756.
While granting the plaintiff's cause of action, the Cantrell court failed to note
two earlier Illinois cases discussing the status of the four privacy torts. In Bureau of
Credit Control v. Scott, Judge Simkins stated that it appeared that Illinois recognized
a cause of action under invasion of privacy for unlawful appropriation only. 36 IIl.
App. 3d 1006, 345 N.E.2d 37 (1976) (citing Annerino v. Dell Publishing Co., 65 Ill.
App. 2d 205, 149 N.E.2d 761 (1958), and Eick v. Perk Dog Food Co., 347 Il. App. 191,
175 N.E.2d 577 (1952)). In Kelly v. Franco, 72 I1. App. 3d 642, 391 N.E.2d 54 (1979),
the court followed the holding in Scott and limited the right to privacy in Illinois to
unlawful appropriation.
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it decisively and explicitly recognized the tort's existence in

Illinois."
The court was also correct in concluding that Douglass had
stated a valid claim of false light. False light privacy protects a
person who has been subjected to highly offensive and false
publicity." The court reasoned that while appearing nude in
Playboy could be prestigious for an actress, appearing nude in
Hustler could be degrading." Other courts have concluded that
Hustler's blend of sexually explicit photographs and racial and
religious humor are offensive." Thus, the court properly held that
the false portrayal of a voluntary association with Hustler states a
valid cause of action in false light privacy. The court also held that
Hustler's untrue implications that Douglass was a lesbian
constituted another valid claim of false light privacy.6
63. Douglass, 769 F.2d at 1133.
64. See supra note 2.
65. Douglass, 769 F.2d at 1135-38. Hustler contends that the publication of
"Robyn Douglass Nude" could not be degrading to one who had posed nude in
Playboy. Id. at 1136. The court cited strong differences in content between the two
magazines. Id. at 1137. The court said that in Playboy, unlike Hustler, the erotic
theme is generally muted. Id. In addition to the magazines themselves, Douglass
presented evidence that local advertising agencies were afraid of their clients'
reactions to the Hustler pictorial. Id. The same agencies cared nothing about her
appearances in Playboy. Id.
Hustler contends that there has been no falsity uttered at all. Brief for Appellant
at 20, Douglass v. Hustler Magazine, Inc. 769 F.2d 1128 (7th Cir. 1985). They claim
that merely disapproving of the magazine should not give rise to a valid cause of
action for false light. Id. The first amendment would bar a cause of action for
invasion of privacy for merely objecting to the magazine's content. Id. For example, a
Ku Klux Klan member could not sue the NAACP merely because his picture
appeared in their newsletter. Id. See, e.g., Falwell v. Penthouse International, Ltd.,
521 F. Supp. 1204, 1210 (W.D. Va. 1981) (plaintiff denied recovery when his only
objection to a publication of an interview was the particular forum). See also,
Namath v. Sports Illustrated, 48 A.D.2d 487, 363 N.Y.S.2d 276 (1976) (no recovery
for unauthorized publication of photograph where nothing was degrading or
untruthful about the representation).
Douglass, however, is not merely objecting to appearing in the magazine.
Douglass, 769 F.2d at 1135. She contends that Hustler is highly objectionable to a
reasonable person. Id. at 1132. See generally Braun v. Flynt, 726 F.2d 245 (5th Cir.
1984) (magazine placed plaintiff in false light by publishing nude photographs which
were stolen).
66. See, e.g., Wood v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 736 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1984)
(nude photograph of plaintiff had been stolen and eventually appeared in magazine).
See generally Braun v. Flynt, 726 F.2d 245 (5th Cir. 1984) (invasion of privacy arising
from a photograph in Chic magazine, a Larry Flynt publication closely resembling
Hustler).
67. Douglass, 769 F.2d at 1135. Although falsely suggesting that someone is a
lesbian may be defamatory, it is also actionable as a false light invasion of privacy.
See Buck v. Savage, 323 S.W.2d 363 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959) (statement that plaintiff
was "queer" was defamatory); W. PRossER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 111
(5th ed. 1.984) (examples of words which are considered defamatory). See also Justice
v. Belo Broadcasting Corp., 472 F. Supp. 145 (N.D. Tex. 1979) (holding that an
accusation of homosexuality place plaintiff's deceased son in a false light; recovery
denied on grounds that the right is personal and did not survive son's death).
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While the court's recognition and application of false light
privacy was correct and helped clarify the tort in Illinois, its
treatment of Douglass' second claim added confusion to the
appropriation branch of the tort. Douglass claimed that Hustler
violated her right to privacy when it unlawfully appropriated her
likeness. 8 The court, however, concluded that Hustler violated
Douglass' right of publicity." The court used the two terms
synonymously, failing to acknowledge that they are separate and
distinct torts.10
The distinction between the torts is in the interest each is
designed to protect. The tort of appropriation protects one's interest
in being left alone.7 1 In contrast, one who claims a violation of his
right of publicity does not need, nor want, privacy.7 2 Instead, that
person is merely seeking compensation for the publication of his
73
name or likeness for commercial purposes.
Douglass' claim is characteristic of the right of privacy 4 and not
publicity. Douglass did not want the photographs to be shown in
68. Douglass, 769 F.2d at 1138.
69. Id. at 1138-39. The term "right of publicity" was coined by Judge Frank in
Haelan Laboratories v. Topps Chewing Gum, 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
346 U.S. 816 (1953).
70. See supra note 37. See also Gautier v. Pro-Football, 304 N.Y. 354, 107
N.E.2d 485, 99 N.Y.S.2d 812 (1952) (a plaintiff claiming that his right of publicity has
been violated does not want privacy); W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 117 (5th ed. 1984) (compares a right of publicity to a trademark in person's
likeness); Felcher and Rubin, Privacy, Publicity and the Portrayalof Real People by
the Media, 88 YALE L.J. 1577 (1979) (recognizes that a privacy cause of action does
not remedy portrayals that cause purely economic injury); Gordon, Right of Property
in Name, Likeness, Personality and History, 55 NW. UL. REv. 553 (1960)
(acknowledges differences between injury to feelings and economic injury); Nimmer,
The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROS. 203 (1954) (privacy is inadequate
to address the claims of celebrities); Treece, Commercial Exploitation of Names,
Likenesses, and Personal Histories, 51 TEx. L. REV. 637 (1973) (confusion exists
because courts fail to recognize actual injury to plaintiff); Comment, The Right of
Publicity - Protectionfor Public Figures and Celebrities, 42 BROOKLYN L. REV. 527
(1976) (right of publicity should be recognized outside the scope of privacy).
71. Prosser, supra note 1, at 389 (quoting Judge Cooley in COOLEY, TORTS 29
(2d. ed. 1888)).
72. Gautier v. Pro-football, 304 N.Y. 354, 361, 107 N.E.2d 485, 489, 99 N.Y.S.2d
812, 816 (1952).
73. Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 835-36, 603 P.2d 425, 438-39,
160 Cal. Rptr. 323, 337 (1979).
74. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 462, 573 (1977).
Although Douglass was a celebrity, she did not necessarily waive her right to protect
her privacy. See Treece, Commercial Exploitation of Names, Likeness and Personal
Histories,51 TEx. L. REv. 637 (1973) (citing Continental Optical Co. v. Reed, 119 Ind.
App. 543, 650, 86 N.E.2d 306, 309 (1949); Note, Lugosi v. Universal Pictures:Descent
of the Right of Publicity, 29 HASTING L. J. 751, 756 (1978) (celebrity status does not
preclude the possibility of hurt feelings). See also Grant v. Esquire, Inc., 367 F. Supp.
876 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (actor Cary Grant claimed magazine unlawfully appropriated his
likeness for a clothing advertisement; Grant sought no compensation for the ad, but
wished to enjoin further use of his picture).

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 19:1053

Hustler.7 5 She did not approve of the publicity, nor did she wish to
be compensated for it.70 The court failed to recognize that Douglass
was offended by the publication. Because of its failure to distinguish
between the torts, the Douglass court added to the confusion
existing in this branch of the privacy torts.
The right of publicity, which the Douglass court attempted to
apply, was first recognized in Haelen Laboratories v. Topps
Chewing Gum. 7 7 In Haelen, a chewing gum manufacturer contracted
with a professional baseball player for the exclusive rights to use the
athlete's picture on a baseball card. 7 The defendant was a
competing manufacturer who used the player's picture on a baseball
card.7 9 The plaintiff claimed that, under section 51 of New York's
Civil Rights Law,80 he should be compensated for the defendant's
75. Brief for Appellee at 8, Douglass v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 769 F.2d 1128
(7th Cir. 1985). After Douglass discovered that Hustler was going to publish the
photographs, she made several attempts to prevent the publishing. Id.
76. Id. In her complaint, Douglass claimed that she had suffered a pecuniary
loss because local advertising agencies disapproved of the Hustler pictorial. Douglass,
769 F.2d at 1143. She also alleged that she had suffered severe emotional distress. Id.
Judge Posner held that the compensatory damage award was excessive for
several reasons. First, he believed that the jury must have been prejudiced by the
slide show. Id. Second, the economist who testified as to Douglass' lost earnings failed
to take into account that the entertainment business is extremely risky, and that
Douglass' career was only damaged in Chicago. Id. Her persona non grata status in
Chicago actually created opportunities for Douglass in other markets. Id. at 1143-44.
Finally, Judge Posner held that the $300,000 award for emotional distress was
"absurd" in light of the injury suffered. Id. at 1144. For a general discussion of
damage awards in privacy cases see Lerman v. Flynt Distributing Co., 745 F.2d 123
(2d Cir. 1984). For a philosophical discussion of Judge Posner's analysis of damage
awards see R. POSNER, ECONOmic ANALYSIS OF LAW 142-52 (2d ed. 1977). For insight
on Judge Posner's economic theory of privacy, compare Posner, John A. Sibley
Lecture: The Right to Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV. 393 (1978), with Fried, Privacy:
Economics and Ethics: A Comment on Posner, 12 GA. L. REV. 423 (1978) (debate on
economic impact of privacy law).
Under right of publicity, Douglass would only have been entitled to recover
reasonable compensation for Hustler's use of the photographs. See Zacchini v.
Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 573 (1977) (a proper remedy for a
right of publicity claim is the reasonable value of the publicity). Lugosi v. Universal
Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 835-36, 603 F.2d 425, 438-39, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323, 337 (1979)
(successful claim entitles plaintiff to reasonable compensation for use).
77. 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 867.
80. The New York Statute states:
Any person whose name, portrait or picture is used within this state for
advertising purposes or for the purposes of trade without the written consent
first obtained as above provided may maintain an equitable action in the
supreme court of this state against the person, firm or corporation so using his
name, portrait or picture to prevent and restrain the use thereof; and may also
sue and recover damages for any injuries sustained . ..
N.Y. CIVIL RIGHTS LAW § 51 (McKinney 1976). The New York State legislature
enacted the statute in response to the New York court of Appeal's rejection of a right
to privacy in Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442
(1902). Section 50 of the law makes it a misdemeanor to use the "name, portrait or
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use of the athlete's name and likeness.81 The court held that "in
addition to and independent of the right of privacy,.

. .

a man has

a right to the publicity value of his photograph." 2 Thus, the right of
publicity was recognized as a separate tort, derivative of the right of
privacy.
Since the right of publicity was first recognized, commentators
have struggled with the nature of the right. Some have labelled it as
a property right.8 s Inherent in the view of right of publicity as a
property right is the ability to assign the right to others. 4 A few
courts have held that the right of publicity is descendable."5 A right
of privacy, however, attaches to a person, and is neither assignable
nor descendable."
picture" of a living person for "advertising purposes, or for the purpose of trade."
N.Y. CIVIL RIGHTS LAW § 50 (McKinney 1976). For a general discussion of the
development of New York's privacy statute see S. METCALF, RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES
OF PUBLISHERS, BROADCASTERS AND REPORTERS, 2.57 (Supp. 1985).
81. Haelan, 202 F.2d at 868.

82. Id.
83. See, e.g., Gordon, Right of Property in Name, Likeness, Personality and
History, 55 NW. U.L. REV. 553, 569-71 (1960) (publicity is a restricted property right);
Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 203, 209-10 (1954)
(assignability of publicity makes it a property right); Samuelson, Reviving Zacchini:
Analyzing First Amendment Defenses in Right of Publicity and Copyright Cases, 57
TUL. L. REV. 836, 839 (1983) (publicity rights should be labeled intangible property
rights); Comment, The Right of Publicity - Protection for Public Figures and
Celebrities, 42 BROOKLYN L. REV. 527 (1976) (publicity should be labeled a property
right in order to lessen confusion). But see W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF
TORTS § 117 (5th ed. 1984) ("It seems quite pointless to dispute over whether such a
right is to be classified as 'property,' it is at least clearly proprietary in its nature.").
Many courts have adopted the view that the right to publicity is a property right.
See, e.g. Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
440 U.S. 908 (1979) (Elvis Presley assigned a property right in his name and likeness
to plaintiff); Haelan, 202 F.2d at 866 (baseball player assigned property right of
picture); Factors Etc., Inc. v. Creative Card Co., 444 F. Supp. 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)
(identified right of publicity as a recognized property right); Price v. Hal Roach
Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (Laurel and Hardy had property right
in their name and likeness); Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277 (D. Minn.
1970) (attempted to clarify confusion by labeling right of publicity as a property
right). But see Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 823-24, 603 P.2d 425, 431,
160 Cal. Rptr. 323, 329 (1979) (rejects need to label right to publicity as a property
right).
84. See, e.g., Haelan, 202 F.2d at 869 (baseball player's likeness assignable to
chewing gum company).
85. See, e.g., Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978)
(Elvis Presley's right of publicity is descendable); Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464
F. Supp. 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (Agatha Christie's publicity rights descend to her
family); Factors Etc., Inc., v. Creative Card Co., 444 F. Supp. 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)
(right descends at death like any other intangible property right); Price v. Hal Roach
Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (actors right of publicity did not
terminate at death). But see Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 603 P.2d
425, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1979) (right may be descendable, but only if exercised during
life of deceased).
86. See, e.g., Maritote v. Desilu Productions, Inc., 345 F.2d 418 (7th Cir. 1965)
(see infra notes 94-96 and accompanying text).
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The Douglass court implicitly adopted the view that the right of
publicity is a property right.87 The Douglass court has failed to
recognize that assignability and descendability are unique to the
right of publicity. As a result, the danger exists that Illinois courts
will erroneously assume that the right to privacy and the right of
publicity are identical torts.
In recognizing a right of publicity, the Douglass court failed to
reconcile its holding with existing Illinois precedent. The court
based its decision on analogous facts in Zachhini v. Scripps-Howard
Broadcasting Co.8s In Zacchini,ss the United States Supreme Court,
interpreting Ohio law, recognized that a right of publicity extends to
non-advertising portions of publications or broadcasts.90 The
Douglass court claimed that there were no Illinois cases like
Zacchini, but assumed that the courts would recognize a right of
publicity based on analogous facts."
Contrary to the Douglass court's assumption, Illinois courts
have had the opportunity to recognize the right of publicity.9s The
courts have consistently rejected claims of commercial appropriation
87. Douglass, 769 F.2d at 1139.
88. 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
89. Hugo Zacchini performed a "human cannonball" act in which he was shot
from a cannon into a net 200 feet away. Id. at 563. The entire act would take
approximately 15 seconds. Id. In 1972, Zacchini was hired to perform at a county fair
in Ohio. Id. Shortly after the fair opened, a reporter from the defendant broadcasting
company attended the performance carrying a movie camera. Id. at 563-64. Zacchini
requested that the reporter not film the act. Id. at 564. The following day, the
reporter returned and videotaped the entire act. Id. The film was shown that evening
on the 11 o'clock news. Id.
Zacchini claimed that the defendant "showed and commercialized the film of his
act without his consent," and that such conduct was an "unlawful appropriation of
plaintiff's professional property." Id. The Supreme Court was asked to decide
whether the first and fourteenth amendments barred Zacchini's right of publicity
claim. Id. at 565. The Court held that the states have an interest to encourage
entertainment by protecting the proprietary interest of the individual. Id. at 573. The
first and fourteenth amendments, therefore, do not protect the media when they
broadcast a performer's entire act without consent. Id. at 575.
90. Id.
91. Douglass, 769 F.2d at 1139.
92. In Bradley v. Cowles Magazine, Inc., 26 I1. App. 2d 331, 168 N.E.2d 64
(1960) the court held that a privacy action is not descendable. In Bradley, a mother
claimed a story written about her son's murder violated her right to privacy. Id. at
332, 168 N.E.2d at 64. The mother was not permitted to recover because the right to
privacy was purely personal, and "died" with her son. Id. at 336, 168 N.E.2d at 66.
There is no cause of action in Illinois for a right based on the appropriation of a
likeness when the subject of the publication is deceased. Carlson v. Dell Publishing
Co., 65 Ill. App. 2d 209, 213 N.E.2d 39 (1965). In Carlson, the children of a woman
who had been raped and murdered brought a right of privacy action against the
publisher of an article concerning the crime. Id. at 210, 213 N.E.2d at 40. The court
decided, therefore, that the right is not descendable. Id. at 213, 213 N.E.2d at 42.
In Bradley and Carlson, the courts firmly established that the tort of
appropriation in Illinois is a personal right. Illinois courts have not taken a contrary
position. See Comment, Privacy in Illinois, supra note 4, at 813-815.
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based on property rather than privacy rights." The Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals has itself rejected the existence of a right to
publicity in Mariote v. Desilu Productions,Inc. 4 The Mariote court
rejected the claim that the right to privacy embodies a descendable
property right.95 Judge Duffy's concurrence explicitly stated that
Illinois courts do not recognize a cause of action for the
appropriation of publicity values.
The Douglass court never mentioned these prior cases in its
decision.96 As a result of overlooking existing precedent, the
Douglass court has created a right of publicity in Illinois, where it
had not previously existed.' 7 Although a federal court may interpret
the law as it believes the state courts would," Illinois courts have
given no indication of a willingness to recognize a right of publicity.
Therefore, the Douglass court erred in concluding that the right of
publicity exists in Illinois.
Not only was the Douglass court's recognition of the right of
publicity erroneous, its approval of Hustler's first amendment
defense is inconsistent with the Zacchini decision, the very case
relied upon by the Douglass court in recognizing the right. In
Zacchini,"s the United States Supreme Court held that first
amendment defenses to common law privacy claims are not
applicable to right of publicity claims.100 However, while the
Douglass court's first amendment analysis was misplaced, it was not
unreasonable.' 0 1 While the Zacchini court expressly rejected a
93. See supra note 92.
94. 345 F.2d 418 (7th Cir. 1965).
95. Id. at 420. The widow and son of Al Capone claimed that their property
rights in Capone's likeness had been violated. Id. at 418. The defendants were the
producers of the television series, "The Untouchables." Id. at 420. The program,
which was a fictionalized account of the Chicago gangster period, featured the Al
Capone character. Id. at 421. The court, acknowledging that no such right exists in
Illinois, dismissed the claim. Id. at 418.
96. Id. at 421.
97. In 1981, the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois erroneously recognized a claim of right of publicity. Winterland Concessions
Co. v. Sileo, 528 F. Supp. 1201 (N.D. Ill. 1981). The Winterland court recognized a
right of publicity which is assignable and transferable, despite the holdings of
Bradley and Carlson. Id. See supra note 92.
98. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
99. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 562.
100. Id. at 571-75. The Supreme Court noted that privacy and publicity are two
different rights. The Court held that it was inappropriate to judge the two torts
under the same standard. Id. See Samuelson, Reviving Zacchini: Analyzing First
Amendment Defenses in Right of Publicity and Copyright Cases, 57 TUL. L. REv.
836, 868 (1983).
101. Other cases decided after Zacchini have applied a first amendment
analysis to right of publicity claims. See, e.g., Cher v. Forum Int'l., Ltd., 692 F.2d 634
(9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1120 (1983) ("The right of publicity has not
been held to outweigh the value of free expression."); Ann-Margaret v. High Society
Magazine, Inc., 498 F. Supp. 401 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (freedom of speech and press
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privacy analysis, it failed to institute a workable analysis to employ
02
in publicity cases.'
The Douglass court recognized that the Zacchini decision did
not provide adequate guidance for the courts.108 The Douglass court
failed, however, to take the opportunity to create reasonable
guidelines for an area of the law wrought with confusion. Although
the Douglass court mentioned the possibility of employing a
copyright analysis in right of publicity cases, 10' it failed to develop
the analysis any further.
The copyright view, as referred to by the Douglass court, is
employed when a defendant's appropriation of a person's name or
likeness is fair and reasonable. 0 5 The fair use doctrine' 0 6 grants a
privilege to a person who uses the copyrighted material in a
reasonable manner. This doctrine has proven reasonable in the
copyright area and should be transferred here. Many commentators
have urged the courts to adopt the copyright approach for right of
publicity cases.'
Growing support for the method warrants its
transcends the right of publicity).
102. The Court held that whenever a performer's "entire act" is appropriated,
the first and fourteenth amendments are not a protection. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 575.
In his dissent, Justice Powell observed that the court's "formula" did not provide a
clear standard for the resolution of future publicity cases. Id. at 579.
103. Douglass, 769 F.2d 1128.
104. The court recognized that Douglass' claim looked very much like a
violation of common law copyright, but declined to apply the analysis, stating,
"[flortunately we need not try to unravel this tangled skein." Id. at 1140.
105. See Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspaper, Inc., 626 F.2d
1171 (5th Cir. 1980). The Triangle court stated four areas which must be evaluated in
order to determine whether the use was fair or not. Id. at 1174-75. The factors are 1)
the purpose and character of the use including whether such use is of a commercial
nature or nonprofit; 2) the nature of the work; 3) the amount of the work used; and 4)
the effect of the use among the potential market. Id. The four factors were codified in
17 U.S.C. 107.(1976).
106. The Fair Use doctrine is defined as:
"A privilege in one other than the owner of the copyright to use the
copyrighted material in a reasonable manner without his consent,
notwithstanding the monopoly granted to the owner by the copyright."
Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 306 (2d Cir. 1966).
107. See Samuelson, Reviving Zacchini: Analyzing First Amendment Defenses
in Right of Publicity and Copyright Cases, 57 TUL. L. REV. 836 (1983). The author
makes her plea for employing a copyright analysis in right of publicity cases by
illustrating the similarities between the two. Id. at 849. First, the enforcement of a
copyright or a publicity right is aimed at compensating the owner for the time and
effort spent to cretae the property right. Id. Second, both copyrights and publicity
rights protect the interest holder from direct appropriations and substantially similar
appropriations. Id. at 850. Third, both types of law are concerned not only with direct
economic injury to the owner, but also the prevention of unjust enrichment. Id.
Finally, the owner of either right should have the right to control when and in what
matter he wishes to "go public" in order to reap the economic benefit of his efforts.
Id. at 851; Comment, An Assessment of the Copyright Model in Right of Publicity
Cases, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 786 (1982) (urges standards set by Congress in the Copyright
Act be employed in right of publicity cases).
Many courts have implied that a copyright analysis should be employed in right
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implementation.
For the first time in Illinois, a court has expressly held that a
defendant who subjects a person to false and offensive notoriety
may be liable for his actions. The Douglass court's recognition of the
false light tort is supported by existing Illinois case law. 0 8 The
Douglass court, however, erred in its analysis of the appropriation
claim. The court failed to draw the necessary distinction between
the right to privacy and right of publicity.109 The court concluded
that Douglass' property rights had been violated when in fact her
privacy right had been.110 The court's error adds to the current
confusion in an area of the law desperately needing clarification.
Moreover, the decision will have substantial impact since Douglass
is the first case to recognize the right of publicity in Illinois.
The Douglass court's recognition of the right of publicity was
inconsistent with precedent. Having recognized the tort, however,
the court should have seized the opportunity to firmly establish the
fair use doctrine as a defense in right of publicity cases."' The
question remains whether Illinois courts will adopt the Douglass
court's broad interpretation of the right of publicity. If they do, the
privacy rights of celebrities may fade as quickly as the flash of a
camera.
Howard L. Teplinsky

of publicity cases. See Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 562 (noted similarity between right of
publicity and copyright); Brewer v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 749 F.2d 527 (9th Cir.
1984) (employs copyright analysis where plaintiff's business cards are printed in
Hustler); Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilet's, Inc., 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983)
(copyright analysis suggested in case that confuses right of privacy with right of
publicity); Martin Luther King, Jr., Center for Social Change, Inc., v. American
Heritage Products, Inc., 694 F.2d 674 (11th Cir. 1983) (suggests copyright analysis in

case that establishes right of publicity in Georgia); Factors Etc., Inc., v. Pro Arts, Inc.,
652 F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1981) (Mansfield, J., dissenting, adopts copyright view); Bi-Rite
v. Button Master, 578 F. Supp. 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (approves of copyright analysis in
right of publicity cases); Presley's Estate v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339 (D.M.J. 1981)

(copyright statute should be employed as a duration limit of the right of publicity).
108. See supra notes 51-63 and accompanying text.
109. See supra notes 68-91 and accompanying text.
110. See supra notes 68-86 and accompanying text.
111. See supra notes 106-20 and accompanying text.

